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2008.5.22

by 인형사 | 2012/12/31 18:28 | 인형사 찾기 | 트랙백 | 덧글(5)

Symptoms of the Bush-Obama Presidency

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/symptoms-of-the-bushobama_b_930260.html

Symptoms of the Bush-Obama Presidency

Posted: 08/18/11 12:12 PM ET


The Saved and the Sacked

Cross-posted from TomDispatch.

Is it too soon to speak of the Bush-Obama presidency?

The record shows impressive continuities between the two administrations, and nowhere more than in the policy of “force projection” in the Arab world. With one war half-ended in Iraq, but another doubled in size and stretching across borders in Afghanistan; with an expanded program of drone killings and black-ops assassinations, the latter glorified in special ceremonies of thanksgiving (as they never were under Bush); with the number of prisoners at Guantanamo having decreased, but some now slated for permanent detention; with the repeated invocation of “state secrets” to protect the government from charges of war crimes; with the Patriot Act renewed and its most dubious provisions left intact -- the Bush-Obama presidency has sufficient self-coherence to be considered a historical entity with a life of its own.

The significance of this development has been veiled in recent mainstream coverage of the national security state and our larger and smaller wars. Back in 2005-2006, when the Iraqi insurgency refused to die down and what had been presented as “sectarian feuding” began to look like a war of national liberation against an occupying power, the American press exhibited an uncommon critical acuteness. But Washington’s embrace of “the surge” in Iraq in 2007 took that war off the front page, and it -- along with the Afghan War -- has returned only occasionally in the four years since.

This disappearance suited the purposes of the long double-presidency. Keep the wars going but normalize them; make them normal by not talking about them much; by not talking about them imply that, while “victory” is not in sight, there is something else, an achievement more realistic and perhaps more grown-up, still available to the United States in the Greater Middle East. This other thing is never defined but has lately been given a name. They call it “success.”

Meanwhile, back at home...

The usual turn from unsatisfying wars abroad to happier domestic conditions, however, no longer seems tenable. In these August days, Americans are rubbing their eyes, still wondering what has befallen us with the president’s “debt deal” -- a shifting of tectonic plates beneath the economy of a sort Dick Cheney might have dreamed of, but which Barack Obama and the House Republicans together brought to fruition. A redistribution of wealth and power more than three decades in the making has now been carved into the system and given the stamp of permanence.

Only a Democratic president, and only one associated in the public mind (however wrongly) with the fortunes of the poor, could have accomplished such a reversal with such sickening completeness.

One of the last good times that President Obama enjoyed before the frenzy of debt negotiations began was a chuckle he shared with Jeff Immelt, the CEO of General Electric and now head of the president’s outside panel of economic advisers. At a June 13th meeting of the Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, a questioner said he assumed that President Obama knew about the difficulties caused by the drawn-out process of securing permits for construction jobs. Obama leaned into the microphone and offered a breezy ad-lib: “Shovel ready wasn’t as, uh, shovel-ready as we expected” -- and Immelt got off a hearty laugh. An unguarded moment: the president of “hope and change” signifying his solidarity with the big managers whose worldly irony he had adopted.

A certain mystery surrounds Obama’s perpetuation of Bush’s economic policies, in the absence of the reactionary class loyalty that accompanied them, and his expansion of Bush’s war policies in the absence of the crude idea of the enemy and the spirited love of war that drove Bush. But the puzzle has grown tiresome, and the effects of the continuity matter more than its sources.

Bush we knew the meaning of, and the need for resistance was clear. Obama makes resistance harder. During a deep crisis, such a nominal leader, by his contradictory words and conduct and the force of his example (or rather the lack of force in his example), becomes a subtle disaster for all whose hopes once rested with him.

The philosopher William James took as a motto for practical morality: “By their fruits shall ye know them, not by their roots.”

Suppose we test the last two and a half years by the same sensible criterion. Translated into the language of presidential power -- the power of a president whose method was to field a “team of rivals” and “lead from behind” -- the motto must mean: by their appointments shall ye know them.

Let us examine Obama, then, by the standard of his cabinet members, advisers, and favored influences, and group them by the answers to two questions: Whom has he wanted to stay on longest, in order to profit from their solidity and bask in their influence? Which of them has he discarded fastest or been most eager to shed his association with? Think of them as the saved and the sacked. Obama’s taste in associates at these extremes may tell us something about the moral and political personality in the middle.

The Saved

Advisers whom the president entrusted with power beyond expectation, and sought to keep in his administration for as long as he could prevail on them to stay:

1. Lawrence Summers: Obama’s chief economic adviser, 2009-2010. As Bill Clinton’s secretary of the treasury, 1999-2001, Summers arranged the repeal of the New Deal-era Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated the commercial banks -- holders of the savings of ordinary people -- from the speculative action of the brokerage houses and money firms. The aim of Glass-Steagall was to protect citizens and the economy from a financial bubble and collapse. Demolition of that wall between savings and finance was a large cause of the 2008 meltdown. In the late 1990s, Summers had also pressed for the deregulation of complex derivatives -- a dream fully realized under Bush. In the first months of the Obama era, given a free hand by the president, he commandeered the bank bailouts and advised against major programs for job creation. He won, and we are living with the results.

In 2009-2010, the critical accessory to Summers’s power was Timothy Geithner, Obama’s treasury secretary. Most likely, Geithner was picked for his position by the combined recommendations of Summers and Bush’s treasury secretary Hank Paulson. The latter once described Geithner as “a very unusually talented young man,” and worked with him closely in 2008 when he was still president of the New York Fed. At that time, he concurred with Paulson on the wisdom of bailing out the insurance giant AIG and not rescuing Lehman Brothers. Obama for his part initiated several phone consultations with Paulson during the 2008 campaign -- often holding his plane on the tarmac to talk and listen. This chain is unbroken. Any tremors in the president’s closed world caused by Summers’s early departure from the administration have probably been offset by Geithner’s recent reassurance that he will stay at the Treasury beyond 2011.

Postscript: In 2011, Summers has become more reformist than Obama. On The Charlie Rose Show on July 13th, he criticized the president’s dilatoriness in mounting a program to create jobs. Thus he urged the partial abandonment of his own policy, which Obama continues to defend.

2. Robert Gates: A member of the permanent establishment in Washington, Gates raised to the third power the distinction of massive continuity: First as CIA director under George H.W. Bush, second as secretary of defense under George W. Bush, and third as Obama’s secretary of defense. He remained for 28 months and departed against the wishes of the president. Gates sided with General David Petraeus and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen in 2009 to promote a major (called “moderate”) escalation of the Afghan War; yet he did so without rancor or posturing -- a style Obama trusted and in the company of which he did not mind losing. In the Bush years, Gates was certainly a moderate in relation to the extravagant war aims of Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and their neoconservative circle. He worked to strengthen U.S. militarism through an ethic of bureaucratic normalization.

His approach has been endorsed and will be continued -- though probably with less canniness -- by his successor Leon Panetta. Without a career in security to fortify his confidence, Panetta is really a member of a different species: the adaptable choice for “running things” without regard to the nature of the thing or the competence required. Best known as the chief of staff who reduced to a semblance of order the confusion of the Clinton White House, he is associated in the public mind with no set of views or policies.

3. Rahm Emanuel: As Obama’s White House chief of staff, Emanuel performed much of the hands-on work of legislative bargaining that President Obama himself preferred not to engage in. (Vice President Joe Biden also regularly took on this role.) He thereby incurred a cheerless gratitude, but he is a man willing to be disliked. Obama seems to have held Emanuel’s ability in awe; and such was his power that nothing but the chance of becoming mayor of Chicago would have plucked him from the White House. Emanuel is credited, rightly or not, with the Democratic congressional victory of 2006, and one fact about that success, which was never hidden, has been too quickly forgotten. Rahm Emanuel took pains to weed out anti-war candidates.

Obama would have known this, and admired the man who carried it off. Whether Emanuel pursued a similar strategy in the 2010 midterm elections has never been looked into. Anyway, the fact that the category “anti-war Democrat” hardly exists in 2011 is an achievement jointly creditable to Emanuel and the president.

4. Cass Sunstein: Widely thought to be the president’s most powerful legal adviser. Sunstein defended and may have advised Obama on his breach of his 2008 promise (as senator) to filibuster any new law awarding amnesty to the telecoms that illegally spied on Americans. This was Obama’s first major reversal in the 2008 presidential campaign: he had previously defended the integrity of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) against the secret encroachment of the National Security Agency (NSA).

At that moment, Obama changed from an accuser to a conditional apologist for the surveillance of Americans: the secret policy advocated by Dick Cheney, approved by President Bush, executed by NSA Director Michael Hayden, and supplied with a rationale by Cheney’s legal counsel David Addington. In his awkward public defense of the switch, Obama suggested that scrutiny of telecom records and their uses by the inspectors general in the relevant agencies and departments should be enough to restore the rule of law.

When it comes to national security policy, Sunstein is a particularly strong example of Bush-Obama continuity. Though sometimes identified as a liberal, from early on he defended the expansion of the national security state under Cheney’s Office of the Vice President, and he praised the firm restraint with which the Ashcroft Justice Department shouldered its responsibilities. “By historical standards,” he wrote in the fall of 2004, “the Bush administration has acted with considerable restraint and with commendable respect for political liberty. It has not attempted to restrict speech or the democratic process in any way. The much-reviled and poorly understood Patriot Act, at least as administered, has done little to restrict civil liberty as it stood before its enactment.” This seems to have become Obama’s view.

Charity toward the framers of the Patriot Act has, in the Obama administration, been accompanied by a consistent refusal to initiate or support legal action against the “torture lawyers.” Sunstein described the Bush Justice Department memos by John Yoo and Jay Bybee, which defended the use of the drowning torture and other extreme methods, in words that stopped short of legal condemnation: "It's egregiously bad. It's very low level, it's very weak, embarrassingly weak, just short of reckless." Bad lawyering: a professional fault but not an actionable offense.

The Obama policy of declining to hold any high official or even CIA interrogators accountable for violations of the law by the preceding administration would likely not have survived opposition by Sunstein. A promise not to prosecute, however, has been implicit in the findings by the Obama Justice Department -- a promise that was made explicit by Leon Panetta in February 2009 when he had just been named President Obama’s new director of the CIA.

As head of the president’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, with an office in the White House, Sunstein adjudicates government policy on issues of worker and consumer safety; yet his title suggests a claim of authority on issues such as the data-mining of information about American citizens and the government’s deployment of a state secrets privilege. He deserves wider attention, too, for his 2008 proposal that the government “cognitively infiltrate” discussion groups on-line and in neighborhoods, paying covert agents to monitor and, if possible, discredit lines of argument which the government judges to be extreme or misleading.

5. Eric Holder: Holder once said that the trial of suspected 9/11 “mastermind” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in a New York City courtroom would be “the defining event of my time as attorney general.” The decision to make KSM’s a civilian trial was, however, scuttled, thanks to incompetent management at the White House: neither the first nor last failure of its kind. The policy of trying suspected terrorists in civilian courts seems to have suffered from never being wholeheartedly embraced by the administration’s inside actors. Local resistance by the New York authorities was the ostensible reason for the failure and the change of venue back to a military tribunal at Guantanamo. No member of the administration besides Holder has been observed to show much regret.

During his 30-month tenure, in keeping with Obama’s willingness to overlook the unpleasant history of CIA renditions and “extreme interrogations,” Holder has made no move to prosecute any upper-level official of any of the big banks and money firms responsible for the financial collapse of 2008. His silence on the subject has been taken as a signal that such prosecutions will never occur. To judge by public statements, the energies of the attorney general, in an administration that arrived under the banner of bringing “sunshine” and “transparency” to Washington, have mainly been dedicated to the prosecution of government whistle-blowers through a uniquely rigorous application of the Espionage Act of 1917. More people have been accused under that law by this attorney general than in the entire preceding 93 years of the law’s existence.

Again, this is a focus that Bush-era attorneys general John Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzales, and Michael Mukasey might have relished, but on which none would have dared to act so boldly. Extraordinary delays in grand jury proceedings on Army Private Bradley Manning, suspected of providing government secrets to WikiLeaks, and Julian Assange, who ran that website, are said to have come from a protracted attempt to secure a legal hold against one or both potential defendants within the limits of a barbarous and almost dormant law.

6. Dennis Ross: Earlier in his career, Obama seems to have cherished an interest in the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In Chicago, he was a friend of the dissident Middle East scholar Rashid Khalidi; during his 2007 primary campaign, he sought and received advice from Robert Malley, former special assistant to President Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter. Both were “realist” opponents of the expansionist policy of Israel’s right-wing coalition government, which subsidizes and affords military protection to Jewish settlements on the occupied West Bank.

Under pressure from the Israel lobby, Obama dissociated himself from all three chosen advisers.

Ross, as surely as Gates, is a member of Washington’s permanent establishment. Recruited for the Carter Defense Department by Paul Wolfowitz, he started out as a Soviet specialist, but his expertise migrated with a commission to undertake a Limited Contingency Study on the need for American defense of the Persian Gulf. An American negotiator at the 2000 Camp David summit, Ross was accused of being an unfair broker, having always “started from the Israeli bottom line.”

He entered the Obama administration as a special adviser to Hillary Clinton on the Persian Gulf, but was moved into the White House on June 25, 2009, and outfitted with an elaborate title and comprehensive duties: Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Central Region, including all of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, Pakistan and South Asia. Ross has cautioned Obama to be “sensitive” to domestic Israeli concerns.

In retrospect, his installation in the White House looks like the first step in a pattern of concessions to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that undid Obama’s hopes for an agreement in the region. Here, caution precluded all inventiveness. It could have been predicted that the ascendancy of Ross would render void the two-state solution Obama anticipated in his carefully prepared and broadly advertised speech to the Arab world from Cairo University in June 2009.

7. Peter Orszag: Director of the Office of Management and Budget from January 2009 to August 2010, Orszag was charged with bringing in the big health insurers to lay out what it would take for them to support the president’s health-care law. In this way, Orszag -- along with the companies -- exerted a decisive influence on the final shape of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. In January 2011, he left the administration to become vice chairman of global banking at Citigroup. A few days out of the White House, he published an op-ed in the New York Times advising the president to extend the Bush-era tax cuts for the top 2% of Americans -- adding that Obama should indicate that the cuts would continue in force only through 2012. Obama took the advice.

8. Thomas Donilon: National Security Adviser and (after the departure of Gates) Obama’s closest consultant on foreign policy. Donilon supported the 34,000 troop-escalation order that followed the president’s inconclusive 2009 Afghanistan War review. He encouraged and warmly applauded Obama’s non-binding “final orders” on Afghanistan, which all the participants in the 2009 review were asked formally to approve. (The final orders speak of “a prioritized comprehensive approach” by which the U.S. will “work with [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai when we can” to set “the conditions for an accelerated transition,” to bring about “effective sub-national governance,” and to “transfer” the responsibility for fighting the war while continuing to “degrade” enemy forces.)

Donilon comes from the worlds of business, the law, and government in about equal measure: a versatile career spanning many orthodoxies. His open and unreserved admiration for President Obama seems to have counted more heavily in his appointment than the low opinion of his qualifications apparently held by several associates. As Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs during the Clinton administration, he helped arrange the eastward expansion of NATO after the Cold War: perhaps the most pointless and destructive bipartisan project of the epoch. He was Executive Vice President for Law and Policy at Fannie Mae, 1999-2005.

The Sacked

Advisers and nominees with views that were in line with Obama's 2008 election campaign and his professed goals in 2009, who have since been fired, or asked to resign, or permitted to step down after their judgments were vindicated, or who have seen their nominations dropped:

1. General James Jones: Former Marine Corps Commandant and a skeptic of the Afghanistan escalation, Jones became the president’s first National Security Adviser. He was, however, often denied meetings with Obama, who seems to have looked on Gates as a superior technocrat, Petraeus as a more prestigious officer, and Donilon as a more fervent believer in the split-the-difference war and diplomatic policies Obama elected to pursue. Jones resigned in October 2010, under pressure.

A curious point: Obama had spoken to Jones only twice before appointing him to so high a post and seems hardly to have come to know him by the time he resigned.

2. Karl Eikenberry: Commander of Combined Forces in Afghanistan before he was made ambassador, Eikenberry, a retired Lieutenant General, had seniority over both Petraeus and then war commander General Stanley McChrystal when it came to experience in that country and theater of war. He was the author of cables to the State Department in late 2009, which carried a stinging rebuke to the conduct of the war and unconcealed hostility toward any new policy of escalation. The Eikenberry cables were drafted in order to influence the White House review that fall; they advised that the Afghan war was in the process of being lost, that it could never be won, and that nothing good would come from an increased commitment of U.S. troops.

Petraeus, then Centcom commander, and McChrystal were both disturbed by the cables -- startled when they arrived unbidden and intimidated by their authority. Obama, astonishingly, chose to ignore them. This may be the single most baffling occasion of the many when fate dealt a winning card to the president and yet he folded. Among other such occasions: the 2008-2009 bank bailouts and the opening for financial regulation; the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the opportunity for a revised environmental policy; the Fukushima nuclear plant meltdowns and a revised policy toward nuclear energy; the Goldstone Report and the chance for an end to the Gaza blockade. But of all these as well as other cases that might be mentioned, the Eikenberry cables offer the clearest instance of persisting in a discredited policy against the weight of impressive evidence.

By an implicit earlier understanding with the president, Ambassador Eikenberry served two years and was allowed to retire in 2011. Like other dissenters within government -- for example, Colonel Morris Davis, the Chief Prosecutor at Guantanamo who resigned because "the guy who said waterboarding is A-okay I was not going to take orders from" -- Eikenberry belongs to the honorable category of officials who have served the country with courage against declared enemies but also against a dangerous persistence in self-begotten errors. It remains a puzzle that this president has not singled out and spoken of the valor of such dissenters. Obama replaced Eikenberry with Ryan Crocker -- the Foreign Service officer brought into Iraq by George W. Bush to help General Petraeus manage the details and publicity around the Iraq surge of 2007-2008.

3. Paul Volcker: Head of the Federal Reserve under Presidents Carter and Reagan, Volker had a record (not necessarily common among upper-echelon workers in finance) entirely free of the reproach of venality. A steady adviser to the 2008 Obama campaign, he lent gravity to the young candidate's professions of competence in financial matters. He also counseled Obama against the one-sidedness of a recovery policy founded on repayment guarantees to financial outfits such as Citigroup and Bank of America: the policy, that is, favored by Summers and Geithner in preference to massive job creation and a major investment in infrastructure. "If you want to be a bank,” he said, “follow the bank rules. If Goldman Sachs and the others want to do proprietary trading, then they shouldn’t be banks.” His advice -- to tighten regulation in order to curb speculative trading -- was adopted late and in diluted form. In January 2010, Jeff Immelt, CEO of General Electric, which paid no federal taxes that year, replaced him.

4. Dennis Blair: As Director of National Intelligence, Blair sought to limit the expansion of covert operations by the CIA. In this quest he was defeated by CIA Director Leon Panetta -- a seasoned infighter, though without any experience in intelligence, who successfully enlarged the Agency’s prerogatives and limited oversight of its activities during his tenure. Blair refused to resign when Obama asked him to, and demanded to be fired. He finally stepped down on May 21, 2010.

Doubtless Blair hurt his prospects irreparably by making clear to the president his skepticism regarding the usefulness of drone warfare: a form of killing Obama favors as the most politic and antiseptic available to the U.S. Since being sacked, Blair has come out publicly against the broad use of drones in Pakistan and elsewhere.

On his way out, he was retrospectively made a scapegoat for the November 2009 Fort Hood, Texas, killing spree by Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan; for the “underwear” bomber’s attempt to blow up a plane on its way to Detroit on Christmas day 2009; and for the failed Times Square car bombing of May 2010 -- all attacks (it was implied) that Blair should have found the missing key to avert, even though the Army, the FBI, and the CIA were unable to do so.

5. James Cartwright: As vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Cartwright passed on to Obama, and interpreted for him, a good deal of information that proved useful in the Afghanistan War review. Their friendship outlasted the process and he came to be known as Obama’s “favorite general,” but Cartwright stirred the resentment of both Petraeus and Mullen for establishing a separate channel of influence with the president. Like Eikenberry, he had been a skeptic on the question of further escalation in Afghanistan. His name was floated by the White House as the front-runner to become chairman of the Joint Chiefs after the retirement of Mullen. Informed of the military opposition to the appointment, Obama reversed field and chose Army Chief of Staff General Martin Dempsey, a figure more agreeable to Petraeus and Mullen.

6. Dawn Johnsen: Obama’s first choice to head the Office of Legal Counsel -- a choice generally praised and closely watched by constitutional lawyers and civil libertarians. Her name was withdrawn after a 14-month wait, and she was denied a confirmation process. The cause: Republican objections to her writings and her public statements against the practice of torture and legal justifications for torture.

This reversal falls in with a larger pattern: the putting forward of candidates for government positions whose views are straightforward, publicly available, and consistent with the pre-2009 principles of Barack Obama -- followed by Obama’s withdrawal of support for the same candidates. A more recent instance was the naming (after considerable delay) of Elizabeth Warren as a special advisor to organize the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, followed by the decision in July not to nominate her as the first director of the bureau.

Avoidance of a drag-out fight in confirmation hearings seems to be the recurrent motive here. Of course, the advantage of such a fight, given an articulate and willing nominee, is the education of public opinion. But in every possible instance, President Obama has been averse to any public engagement in the clash of ideas. “Bottom line is that it was going to be close,” a Senate Democratic source told the ABC reporter Jake Tapper when Johnsen’s name was withdrawn. "If they wanted to, the White House could have pushed for a vote. But they didn't want to 'cause they didn't have the stomach for the debate."

Where the nomination of an “extreme” candidate has hardened a wrong impression of Obama as an extremist, might not a public hearing help to eradicate the very preconception that every tactical withdrawal tends to confirm? This question is not asked.

7. Greg Craig: For two years special counsel in the Clinton White House, he led the team defending the president in the impeachment proceedings in Congress. Craig’s declaration of support for Obama in March 2007 was vital to the insurgent candidate, because of his well-known loyalty to the Clintons. Obama made him White House Counsel, and his initial task was to draw up plans for the closing of Guantanamo: a promise made by the president on his first day in the Oval Office. But once the paper was signed, Obama showed little interest in the developing plans. Others were more passionate. Dick Cheney worked on a susceptible populace to resurrect old fears. The forces against closure rallied and spread panic, while the president said nothing. Craig was defeated inside the White House by the “realist” Rahm Emanuel, and sacked.

8. Carol Browner: A leading environmentalist in the Clinton administration, Browner was given a second shot by Obama as director of the White House Office of Energy and Climate Change Policy. She found her efforts thwarted within the administration as well as in Congress: in mid-2010 Obama decided that -- as a way to deal with global warming -- cap-and-trade legislation was a loser for the midterm elections. Pressure on Obama from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to heed business interests served as a strong incitement in forcing Browner’s resignation after the democratic “shellacking” in midterm elections: a result that his abandonment of cap-and-trade had failed to prevent. The White House had no backup plan for addressing the disaster of global warming. After Browner’s resignation in March 2011, her position was abolished. Since then, Obama has seldom spoken of global warming or climate change.

Moral and Political Limbo

The Obama presidency has been characterized by a refined sense of impossibility. A kind of suffocation sets in when a man of power floats carefully clear of all unorthodox stimuli and resorts to official comforters of the sort exemplified by Panetta. As the above partial list of the saved and the sacked shows, the president lives now in a world in which he is certain never to be told he is wrong when he happens to be on the wrong track. It is a world where the unconventionality of an opinion, or the existence of a possible majority opposed to it somewhere, counts as prima facie evidence against its soundness.

So alternative ideas vanish -- along with the people who represent them. What, then, does President Obama imagine he is doing as he backs into one weak appointment after another, and purges all signs of thought and independence around him? We have a few dim clues.

A popular book on Abraham Lincoln, Team of Rivals, seems to have prompted Obama to suppose that Lincoln himself “led from behind” and was committed to bipartisanship not only as a tactic but as an always necessary means to the highest good of democracy. A more wishful conceit was never conceived; but Obama has talked of the book easily and often to support a “pragmatic” instinct for constant compromise that he believes himself to share with the American people and with Lincoln.

A larger hint may come from Obama’s recently released National Strategy for Counterterrorism, where a sentence in the president’s own voice asserts: "We face the world as it is, but we will also pursue a strategy for the world we seek." If the words "I face the world as it is" have a familiar sound, the reason is that they received a trial run in Obama’s 2009 Nobel Prize speech. Those words were the bridge across which an ambivalent peacemaker walked to confront the heritage of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King with the realities of power as experienced by the leader of the only superpower in the world.

Indeed, Obama’s understanding of international morality seems to be largely expressed by the proposition that "there's serious evil in the world" -- a truth he confided in 2007 to the New York Times columnist David Brooks, and attributed to the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr -- combined with the assertion that he is ready to "face the world as it is." The world we seek is, of course, the better world of high morality. But morality, properly understood, is nothing but a framework of ideals. Once you have discharged your duty, by saying the right words for the right policies, you have to accommodate the world.

This has become the ethic of the Bush-Obama administration in a new phase. It explains, as nothing else does, Obama’s enormous appetite for compromise, the growing conventionality of his choices of policy and person, and the legitimacy he has conferred on many radical innovations of the early Bush years by assenting to their logic and often widening their scope. They are, after all, the world as it is.

Obama’s pragmatism comes down to a series of maxims that can be relied on to ratify the existing order -- any order, however recent its advent and however repulsive its effects. You must stay in power in order to go on “seeking.” Therefore, in “the world as it is,” you must requite evil with lesser evil. You do so to prevent your replacement by fanatics: people, for example, like those who invented the means you began by deploring but ended by adopting. Their difference from you is that they lack the vision of the seeker. Finally, in the world as it is, to retain your hold on power you must keep in place the sort of people who are normally found in places of power.

David Bromwich writes on civil liberties and America's wars for the Huffington Post. A TomDispatch regular, as well as contributor to the New York Review of Books, his latest essay, "How Lincoln Explained Democracy," appeared recently in the Yale Review.

by 인형사 | 2011/12/30 17:16 | 인형사 찾기 | 트랙백 | 덧글(0)

A Very Peaceful Russian Revolt, by BORIS KAGARLITSKY

http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/12/28/a-very-peaceful-russian-revolt/


December 28, 2011

Politics is Now Being Played Out in Public

A Very Peaceful Russian Revolt

by BORIS KAGARLITSKY


The calls by the “moderate left” for passively following behind the liberals are supposedly based on the need to “work among the people”, to go where the masses are. But how, and with whom, are the forces of the left to set out after these ardently pursued masses? With badly printed leaflets full of abstract slogans?

The December outburst of street protest in Russia was the natural result of a growing discontent which for several years had been building up but which had not found a means of expression. Nevertheless, it would have been hard to predict that a crisis would break out over the results of elections to the essentially decorative State Duma, which has no power (its members, including the opposition, are mere puppets of the administration). Just a few weeks ago, when I discussed the looming political crisis with colleagues at our institute, we could not identify what might serve as the detonator for an explosion. The general conclusion to which participants in the discussion came was that the pretext for mass protests would be something ridiculous, some vulgar everyday transgression by the authorities.

The elections played exactly this role. The fictitious nature of the whole proceedings and the open collusion between the authorities and the Duma opposition were no secret to the public, especially the part of it that attended the demonstrations. But the massive, absurd and virtually unconcealed fraud was perceived less as a political act than as a display of boorishness. It was as though society had simply looked for an excuse to break out in revolt, and had found it when the routine procedure of election rigging unexpectedly became an object of general discussion.

Meanwhile, the political significance of the drama now being played out goes far beyond the question of the composition of Russia’s pseudo-parliament and even of the rules governing its formation. The sole political function of the Duma elections of 2011 was to prepare the way for the presidential election. This in turn will not be the procedure that decides the country’s future leader, whose name will be known in advance.

Bourgeois-bureaucratic elite

Here in Russia decisions are not taken by electors, and not by the congresses of political parties, whether of the ruling United Russia or its historical predecessors, but by gatherings of the bourgeois-bureaucratic elite at which serious questions are discussed without undue ceremony or show. The necessary information was released to the public on September 24 at the congress of United Russia, and the matter was considered closed. The function of the Duma elections was to legitimise decisions that had already been taken, and to formalise in legal terms relationships that existed anyway.

The December crisis has torn up the scenario that the authorities had prepared. The rapid decline in the popularity of United Russia, accompanied by the growth of protest activity and the complete discrediting of the existing election procedures has created a qualitatively new situation in which the national voting process is not only failing to serve its basic purpose – legitimising the election of the elites – but is becoming a problem in itself. This does not, of course, mean that the presidential election will be “genuine”. There will be no single opposition candidate, and if such a person were to appear, society would only be the worse for it. Today’s “opposition” in Russia consists either of splinter groups of the existing authorities, or of marginal forces of various hues, mostly liberals and nationalists.

‘Opposition’

The rejection by society of the authorities, as emerged clearly in December, does not by any means amount to sympathy for the oppositionists. Nor does the agenda urged on the people by the organisers of the antigovernment demonstrations reflect the actual causes of the mass discontent. The liberal leaders of the opposition are not willing to raise social questions, even those that have their own supporters aroused. A whole group of left-wing commentators effusively defend the correctness of the liberal politicians, explaining to their readers that if we raise social demands we risk “narrowing” the mass base of the protests. This might seem logical – the demand for honest elections is “broader” than the call for free medical care. The problem, though, is that in Russia today people are much less concerned about elections than about the fate of their local hospital.

On December 10, roughly 250,000 people turned out in demonstrations throughout the country. In 2005, when protests broke out against the government’s social policies, 2.5 million people came onto the streets despite the January frost. The mass base for social protests is tens of times broader than the social layers on which the organisers of the recent meetings were relying.

It should not be concluded from this that Russians have no need for honest elections. But the overwhelming majority of the people will only join in struggle for them, putting themselves beneath the batons of the police, when it becomes clear that elections can bring changes to their lives, that they can bring about the preservation of the social state for which the great majority of citizens are calling. Here, however, the oppositionists not only fail to share the views of the people, but on the contrary, are to be found in the same camp with the authorities.

To the disturbances in Russia’s main cities, the country’s stock markets responded with a plunge in share prices, while the business media explained the pessimism of investors on the basis that, against the background of protests, the government might be reluctant to implement “essential reforms” such as doing away with free education and health care. The real reason for the stand-off between society and the authorities lies precisely in the resistance by the less well-off to the anti-social policies of the elites. This resistance caused the collapse of the farce surrounding the Duma elections, and it has left the authorities unable to take decisive action against the opposition. But the opposition itself is no less afraid of change, even more so, than the authorities.

The problem with today’s protest leaders and their actions is something quite different from the fact that they are not from the left and hence, naturally, cannot go further than the slogan of fair elections, rejecting any social agenda. The problem lies in the fact that their position must necessarily lead to a failure to win even the minimal “general democratic” demands that are now being formulated. Either we build a genuinely massive, powerful movement, united around a full-blooded democratic program which has to include demands corresponding to the basic interests of the majority of Russia’s people, or the present revolt will expire without having achieved even the limited goals which the liberals and their helpers among the “left” are prepared to support.

‘Left’

The calls by the “moderate left” for passively following behind the liberals are supposedly based on the need to “work among the people”, to go where the masses are. But how, and with whom, are the forces of the left to set out after these ardently pursued masses? With badly printed leaflets full of abstract slogans? The members of the left come to the demonstrations with crumpled newssheets, printed in close type on bad paper, that might well grace a museum of the 1905 revolution. Then, not quite resolved to distribute this material to the surrounding public, they hand it out to one another. The anarchists agitate among the Stalinists, the Stalinists among the Trotskyists, the Trotskyists among the social democrats, and the latter in turn hand out their material to the anarchists. Closed circuit.
The opposition is incapable of proposing to its supporters anything but endlessly repeated meetings whose ineffectiveness is obvious to everybody. And if despite this the Kremlin cannot bring the situation under its control, that is simply because the people in the Kremlin have no idea either about what needs to be done in Russia. Whenever tensions are seen to be dropping, the authorities come out with another declaration or measure that pours oil on the flames of the crisis.

The situation is leading to an inevitable dead end, since a real triumph of democracy would simultaneously mean the complete collapse of the existing opposition. The authorities are not willing to retreat, and the opposition is scared of winning. Undoubtedly, both sides would prefer to quietly reach an agreement with one another.

But politics in Russia is now being played out in public, and hence a secret deal between the two sides would no longer amount to a real settlement. In chess such a situation is known as a stalemate. Life, however, is not a chess game, in which the pieces can simply be removed from the board and the players can start again. Sooner or later the situation will fly out of control, moving into a new and acute phase. That will happen when political protest is amplified by social protest, and new players come onto the scene. For this, it is evident, we will not need to wait long.

Boris Kagarlitsky is the director of the Institute of Globalization Studies.

by 인형사 | 2011/12/29 04:42 | 인형사 찾기 | 트랙백 | 덧글(0)

Playing chess in Eurasia

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/ML22Ag02.html


THE ROVING EYE
Playing chess in Eurasia

By Pepe Escobar 
Dec 22, 2011

Bets are off on which is the great story of 2011. Is it the Arab Spring(s)? Is it the Arab counter-revolution, unleashed by the House of Saud? Is it the "birth pangs" of the Greater Middle East remixed as serial regime changes? Is it R2P ("responsibility to protect") legitimizing "humanitarian" bombing? Is it the freeze out of the "reset" between the US and Russia? Is it the death of al-Qaeda? Is it the euro disaster? Is it the US announcing a Pacific century cum New Cold War against China? Is it the build up towards an attack on Iran? (well, this one started with Dubya, Dick and Rummy ages ago ...)

Underneath all these interlinked plots - and the accompanying hysteria of Cold War-style headlines - there's a never-ending thriller floating downstream: Pipelineistan. That's the chessboard


where the half-hidden twin of the Pentagon's "long war" is played out. Virtually all current geopolitical developments are energy-related. So fasten your seat belts, it's time to revisit Dr Zbigniew Brzezinski's "grand chessboard" in Eurasia to find out who's winning the Pipelineistan wars.

Got tickets to the opera?
Let's start with Nabucco (the gas opera). Nabucco is above all a key, strategic Western powerplay; how to deliver Caspian Sea gas to Europe. Energy execs call it "opening the Southern Corridor" (of gas). The problem is this Open Sesame will only deliver if supplied by a tsunami of gas from two key "stans" - Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

The 3,900-kilometer Nabucco will hit five transit countries - Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey - and it may end costing a staggering 26 billion euros (US$33.7 billion) [1].

Construction - endlessly delayed - might start by 2013. Essentially, everything is still a bloody mess. Nobody knows about prices, or the details of transit rights. Turkey is also eager to resell the gas on its own. Moreover, if Baku and Ankara decide to develop in tandem the Shah Deniz phase II [2] fields in Azerbaijan to feed the pipeline, they will need an extra $20 billion in investment.

Turkmenistan's president, the spectacularly named Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, sticks to his trademark wobbly script (Check him out singing his original hit "For You, My White Flower" ). He always says the European Union's myriad proposals "would be studied" and cooperation with the Europeans is "a strategic priority" of his foreign policy. But the EU's Holy Grail - an ironclad agreement to get the gas - is ever more elusive. The Russians and even the Azeris bet this will never happen.

Our man Gurbanguly, savvy operator that he is, would prefer to hatch his eggs in a Chinese basket - rather than in those far-away euro-messy lands. That's why he wobbles - feigning he's open to any offer. He knows better than anybody that for the Europeans Nabucco is the key to be released (a bit) from the grip of Russia's Gazprom. At the same time he keeps in mind how to maximize his Chinese profits while not antagonizing Russia.

Every European bureaucracy (not) worth its name is behind Nabucco [3], and most of all an eager European Commission (EC), the EU's fat salary-infested executive branch. The EC's do-or-die strategic priority is to link the Turkmen port of Turkmenbashi to the Absheron Peninsula in Azerbaijan via a Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline (TCGP) [4]. It's a breeze; I did the trip on a vodka-infested Azeri cargo ship and it took me only 12 hours.

But how to pull it off? Moscow locked up all Azeri gas. Gazprom locked up all the surplus gas from Turkmenistan. The only option would be Iran. Now tell that to the US Senate - who has declared economic war [5] against Iran.

Let's go TAPI!
A detour to AfPak is in order. Not even the deities who lord over the Hindu Kush know if the $7.6 billion (and counting), 1,735-kilometer TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline will ever be built.

For Turkmenistan's Oil and Gas Minister Bayramgeldy Nedirov, "There are no doubts that this [TAPI] project will be realized." [6] Pakistan and India - after infinite haggling - have finally agreed on pricing. Roughly a third of the pipeline's cost will be financed by the Philippines-based Asian Development Bank - since both Afghanistan and Pakistan are essentially broke.

Imagine a steel serpent entering western Afghanistan towards Herat, going south underground (to prevent terrorist bombing) parallel to the Herat-Kandahar road, then taking a detour via Quetta - home of Taliban supremo Mullah Omar - to Multan in Pakistan and finally reaching Fazilka, on the Indian border.

To quote Sam Spade in The Maltese Falcon, "This is the stuff dreams are made of," since the Bill Clinton administration, way before 9/11 and the now virtually extinct GWOT ("global war on terror"). Cynics may read this as gas republic Turkmenistan - holder of the fourth-largest reserves in the world - doing better to promote economic development and security in Afghanistan than 100,000 US troops.

The gas for TAPI will come from the new South Yolotan-Osman field - which already supplies China (according to British auditor Gaffney, Cline & Associates this is the world's second-largest [7] gas field, after South Pars in Iran). Our man Gurbanguly, by the way, issued a decree changing the gas field's name to Galkynys - Turkmen for "Renaissance"; after all, Gurbanguly's reign has been baptized as "The Epoch of New Renaissance and Great Transformations". These "transformations" have nothing to do with the Arab Spring(s).

Here we find yet another clever gambit by our man Gurbanguly. He keeps an open door to Nabucco by freeing the gas from Dauletabad field in southeast Turkmenistan to flow via a domestic pipeline to the Caspian, and then to the oh so elusive TCGP. Even the (delicious) sturgeons in the Caspian know that without a TCGP, Nabucco is DOA.

At least for a year now our man Gurbanguly has been telling every diplomat and top oil exec in sight that he rejects Russia's interference over Turkmenistan's gas strategy. [8] But apparently he didn't inform the Russians.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did visit Ashgabat - the Las Vegas of Central Asia - to talk business [9]. And then, in a daring plot twist, suddenly Gazprom proclaimed its love of TAPI! Just imagine; the Americans have been dreaming of TAPI since 1996, just for rival Gazprom to barge in at overtime. No one knew what Medvedev offered to Gurbanguly so he wouldn't keep entertaining fancy Louis Vuitton ideas. Perhaps nothing. We'll come to that in a minute.

Ask the babushkas
TAPI's direct competition is IPI - the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (India, pressured by the US, has virtually dropped out; China is ready to pounce and turn it into IPC). Well, who else but Gazprom now wants to get into the IP groove as well [10], alongside China's CNPC? The Iranian stretch of the pipeline is virtually ready. The Pakistani stretch begins in early 2012. Still another Russian chess move - and Washington never saw it coming.

Even a wooden babushka knows what Moscow does not want; the Afghan chapter of the US Empire of Bases never going away. Then there's regime change in Syria (with the implicit end of the Russian Black Sea fleet using the port of Tartus). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) advances in the Black Sea. The ever-expanding (at least rhetorically) US missile defense and the US's "New Silk Road" gambit to re-penetrate Central Asia [11].

It was Russia that authorized the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to supply US and NATO troops in Afghanistan [12], an endless trek across Eurasia, including Uzbekistan - whose ghastly dictatorship US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised for its political "progress" - and Tajikistan. Pushing Moscow too far is not exactly a winning strategy.

Moscow also sees how Washington has antagonized virtually everyone in Pakistan - with the non-stop "war of the drones", the non-stop violations of territorial sovereignty, the non-stop threats to barge in and "take over your nuclear arsenal". Washington's priority is for Islamabad to attack the Pakistani Taliban in Balochistan and thus be dragged into a civil war against not only Pashtuns but also Balochis. As Moscow - and Beijing - survey the battlefield, all they have to do is bide their time while sipping green tea.

When former reds see red
The Russian-Chinese entente is not always a Bolshoi dance.

Russia wants to sell gas to China for $400 per 1,000 cubic meters (cm), the same price it charges Europe. The wily Turkmen charge the Chinese only $250. Beijing already spent $4 billion in South Yolotan (and counting); they want all the gas they can get to supply the hugely successful Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China pipeline (which they built), online for two years now [13]. Beijing is insatiable; oil major CNPC wants to import no less than 500% more gas from Central Asia by 2015 [14].

What this means is that for China the potentially $1 trillion-worth, 30-year gas deal with Russia may not be as imperative [15]. Gazprom's strategy boils down to two pipelines from Siberia to China. For Russia, this is absolutely essential in terms of making money out of Siberia. Geopolitical ramifications are immense. A close Russia-China steel umbilical cord may be interpreted in Europe - a virtual hostage of Gazprom - as perhaps a signal that they need Iran more than ever. At the same time Russia remains extremely uncomfortable with China's energy onslaught all across Central Asia.

This is Beijing's take, in a nutshell. We won't pay European prices for Turkmen gas. And we don't want a TCGP to Europe. China, Russia, even Iran, no one outside NATO wants the TCGP [16].

So this is how it breaks down. The Turkmen may sell gas to


China and Iran. They may even sell gas to South Asia via TAPI (after all Gazprom has joined the party). But forget about selling gas to Europe - where Gazprom rules. No one knows whether our man Gurbanguly got the message.

All hail the gas Czar
Any way you look at it, there's this inescapable feeling the Czar of Pipelineistan is Vladimir Putin (and just like the Terminator, he will be back, next March, as president, whatever his current predicament). After all, Russia produces more oil than Saudi Arabia (at least until 2015 [17]) and has the world's largest known reserves of natural gas. Around 40% of all Russian state funds come from oil and gas.

Putin's plan is deceptively simple; Gazprom "takes over" Western Europe and thus neutralizes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Exhibit 1 is the Nord Stream, a $12 billion, twin 1224-km pipeline, respecting extraordinary complex environmental guidelines, launched last September. That's gas from Siberia delivered under the Baltic Sea, bypassing problematic Ukraine, straight to Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Denmark and the Czech republic (10% of the entire EU annual gas consumption, or one third of China's entire current gas consumption). Former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder heads the Nord Stream consortium.

Exhibit 2 is the South Stream (the shareholder agreement is already signed between Russia, Germany, France and Italy). That's Russian gas delivered under the Black Sea to the southern part of the EU, through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia. Instrumental in the deal was the quality time Putin spent with his close pal, former Italian prime minister Silvio "bunga bunga" Berlusconi.

Nord Stream drove Washington nuts. Not only it redesigned Europe's energy configuration; it forged an unbreakable German-Russian strategic link. Putin, better than anyone, knows how pipelines hardwire governments. South Stream is driving Washington nuts because it beats Nabucco hands down, and it's way cheaper. Talk about a geopolitical - and geoeconomic - battle.

Washington - alarmed at what the Germans deliciously dubbed the "modernization partnership" with Russia - is left to promote European "resistance" to Gazprom's onslaught, as if Germany was Zucotti Park and Russia was the NYPD. Again here's Pipelineistan infused with political reverberations. For instance, Germany and Italy are totally against NATO expansion. The reason? Nord and South Stream. The formidable German export machine is fueled by Russian energy; the motto might be "Put a Gazprom in my Audi".

As William Engdahl, author of the seminal A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics in the New World Order, has observed, the "Nord Stream and South Stream are poised to leap out of the world of energy security and choreograph an altogether new power dynamic in the heart of Europe." [18]

Putin's roadmap is his paper, "A new integration project for Eurasia: The future in the making", published by Izvestia in early October [19]. It may be dismissed as megalomania, but it may also be read as an ippon - Putin loves judo - against NATO, the International Monetary Fund and neo-liberalism.

True, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of "snow leopard" Kazakhstan was already talking about a Eurasian Union way back in 1994. Putin, though, makes it clear this wouldn't be Back In The USSR territory, but a "modern economic and currency union" stretching all across Central Asia.

For Putin, Syria is just a detail; the real thing is Eurasian integration. No wonder Atlanticists started freaking out with this suggestion of "a powerful supranational union that can become one of the poles of today's world while being an efficient connecting link between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific Region". Compare it with US President Barack Obama and Hillary's Pacific doctrine [20].

You integrate when I say so
Everything is up for grabs at the crucial intersection of hardcore geopolitics and Pipelineistan. Washington's New Silk Road dream is not exactly a success. [21]

Moscow, for its part, now wants Pakistan to be a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) [22]. That also applies to China in relation to Iran. Imagine Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran coordinating their mutual security inside a strengthened SCO, whose motto is "non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-interference in the affairs of other countries". R2P it ain't.

Snags abound. For China the SCO is above all about economics and trade [23]. For Russia it's above all a security bloc [24], which must absolutely find a regional solution to Afghanistan that keeps the Taliban under control and at the same time gets rid of the Afghan chapter of the US Empire of Bases.

As Pipelineistan goes, with Russia, Central Asia and Iran controlling 50% of world's gas reserves, and with Iran and Pakistan as virtual SCO members, the name of the game becomes Asian integration - if not Eurasian. China and Russia now coordinate foreign policy in extreme detail. The trick is to connect China and Central Asia with South Asia and the Gulf - with the SCO developing as an economic/security powerhouse. In parallel, Pipelineistan may accelerate the full integration of the SCO as a counterpunch to NATO.

In realpolitik terms, that makes much more sense than a New Silk Road invented in Washington. But tell that to the Pentagon, or to a possible bomb Iran, scare China, neo-con-remote-controlled next president of the United States.

Notes
1. Hungary sees Nabucco costs quadrupling, may sue French firm, Reuters, Oct 24, 2011.
2. Shah Deniz II Natural Gas Field: What Will Azerbaijan's Decision Be? ITGI, Nabucco or TAP?, Turkish Weekly, 18 August 2011.
3. EU banks throw their weight behind Nabucco pipeline, EU Observer, September 2010.
4. Trans-Caspian pipeline vital to Nabucco, Petroleum Economist, October 2011.
5. U.S. Senate Passes Iran Oil Sanctions as EU Blacklist Grows, Bloomberg, December 5, 2011.
6. ‘Gas pipeline deal for Pakistan, India imminent’ , The Express Tribune, November 5, 2011.
7. Second Gas Congress of Turkmenistan, Open Central Asia, June 5 2011.
8. Gazprom Disbelief Draws Turkmen Ire , Moscow Times, 22 November 2011.
9. Russia, Turkmenistan focus on energy cooperation, Caspian problems, innovation BSR Russia, 24 October 2010.
10. Russian gas giant may fund 780-km pipeline, Pakistan Observer, August 22, 2011.
11. The United States' "New Silk Road" Strategy: What is it? Where is it Headed?, US State Dept, September 29, 2011.
12. US Now Relies On Alternate Afghan Supply Routes, NPR, September 16, 2011.
13. China plays Pipelineistan, Asia Times Online, Dec 24, 2009.
14. Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline’s Capacity To Nearly Double, Oil and Gas Eurasia, August 29, 2011.
15. Russia, China closer to gas deal says Putin, RIA NOVOSTI, October 11.
16. China Plans To Buy All Turkmenistan's Gas To Scuttle Sales To Europe..., Geofinancial, November 24, 2011.
17. Saudi Arabia to overtake Russia as top oil producer-IEA , Reuters, Nov 9, 2011.
18. http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=27653 , Global Research, November 14, 2011.
19. Izvestia publishes an article by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on cooperation and interaction in the post-Soviet space.
20. China and the US: The roadmaps , Al-Jazeera, 31 Oct 2011.
21. US's post-2014 Afghan agenda falters , Asia Times Online, Nov 4, 2011.
22. Russia endorses full SCO membership for Pakistan Dawn, November 7, 2011.
23. SCO member states vow to strengthen economic cooperation , Xinhua, Nov. 7, 2011.
24.Russia, China don’t see US in SCO , Voice of Russia, Nov 1, 2011.

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.

(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

by 인형사 | 2011/12/26 05:44 | 인형사 찾기 | 트랙백 | 덧글(0)

Maybe that war with China isn't so far off


http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ML22Ad05.html

Maybe that war with China isn't so far off
By Peter Lee

The year 2011 has been a tough one for Sino-United States ties. And 2012 does not look like it's going to be a good year either, with a presidential election year in the United States. For both the Democratic and Republican parties, bashing the Chinese economic, military and freedom-averse menace will probably be a campaign-trail staple.

Lunch-pail issues - protectionism and the undervalued yuan - will focus disapproving US eyes.

Tensions will also be exacerbated by the Barack Obama administration's "return to Asia" - a return to proactive containment of China - and the temptation to apply dangerous and


destabilizing new doctrine, preventive diplomacy, to China.

The potential for friction certainly exists.

China, as it approaches a leadership transition, wants to avoid friction. However, the United States appears to welcome it and, in the election year, might even incite it.

The US, under the Obama administration and thanks in large part to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's team at the State Department, has been quite adept in putting China at a geopolitical disadvantage in Europe, Africa and Asia.

It is a valid question, however, to ask whether all this diplomatic and military tail-twisting is the best way to advance America's interests - which are meat and potatoes economic concerns, rather than pie-in-the-sky security scenarios, as Clinton made clear in her manifesto, America's Pacific Century:
Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests ... broader commitment to elevate economic statecraft as a pillar of American foreign policy. Increasingly, economic progress depends on strong diplomatic ties, and diplomatic progress depends on strong economic ties. And naturally, a focus on promoting American prosperity means a greater focus on trade and economic openness in the Asia-Pacific. [1]
In any event, the media are happy to stir the geopolitical pot on America's behalf.

In quick succession in December, the Western press hyped two dubious stories about China's military posture.

The first, the Karber/Georgetown report aka "Tunnelgate", rehashed old information in the public domain and combined it with wishful thinking disguised as speculation to raise the specter of a previously unknown underground arsenal of Chinese nuclear missiles.

The second, call it "PLA Navy Gate" was cited by a report that President Hu Jintao had charged the Chinese Central Military Commission to prepare for armed struggle with the United States in China's adjacent waters.

Or, as the Evening Standard put it: "Prepare for war, Chinese navy is told as Pacific tensions grow." [2]

M Taylor Fravel of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology called that claim into question with a detailed fisking at The Diplomat, pointing out that Hu's remarks had not been made before the CMC, but in a meeting with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worthies from the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). [3]

A quick glance at the original report of Hu's remarks, in the Liberation Army News, reveals the true significance, if any, of the occasion.

Hu, dressed in a garish military green tunic, is accompanied by heir apparent Xi Jinping as the two civilian supremos engage in a grip and grin with loyal navy cadres, concluding with one of those impressive mass photos meant to demonstrate the continuity of CCP control of the military.

As to "extend and deepen preparedness for military struggle", it appears to be a Defcon Zero nothingburger; that particular task was listed eighth in the priorities for the navy, behind such strategic imperatives as "be guided by the important ideologies of Deng Xiaoping theory and 'Three Represents'." [4]

Questions of newsworthiness and accuracy notwithstanding, clearly stories about the China threat attract eyeballs, accumulate links, and feed into the official Western narrative, so we can expect more of them in 2012.

They will also reverberate inside an echo chamber thanks to the anti-China dynamic of US presidential politics, and the China-containment posture built into America's security doctrine.

The "return to Asia" is built around a security narrative that relies on framing China as an arrogant, aggressive, and destabilizing presence in the region.

The Obama administration jumped into the South China Sea issue - an insoluble tangle of disputes between the nations bordering the sea and the People's Republic of China (PRC) - with the argument that the US has a national interest in freedom of the navigation in the South China Sea.

This posture usually involves an invocation of the critical economic importance of the South China Sea, citing the fact that 25% of the world's crude and half the world's merchant tonnage currently pass through its waters.

As a look at a map and a passing acquaintance with patterns of maritime traffic reveals, the vital nature of this waterway is something of a canard. It is a big ocean out there. There are big ships out there as well, ships that are too big to pass through the Strait of Malacca that feeds into the South China Sea - they are called "post Malaccamax".

These ships pass through the deeper and wider Strait of Lombok west of Java.

The bulk of Australian iron ore shipments destined for Asia already pass through Lombok.

If Chinese perfidy should shut down the route through the South China Sea, Japanese crude carriers from the Middle East could simply swing south of Sumatra, cross the Lombok Strait, and sail up the east coast of the Philippines. Studies have concluded that the detour would add three days to sailing times and perhaps 13.5% to shipping costs; an annoying inconvenience, perhaps, but also not an energy or economic Armageddon. The bloviating about the vulnerability and critical importance of the South China Sea maritime route can probably be traced to the fact that it is an international waterway and therefore a suitable arena for the United States to flex its "freedom of the seas" muscle.

Smaller nations bordering the South China Sea welcome the US as a counterweight to China in their sometimes bloody but low level conflicts over fishing and energy development issues.

Any US attempt to lord it over the Lombok Strait in a similar fashion would presumably not be welcomed by Indonesia, which exercises full, unquestioned sovereignty over the waterway.

Also, if traffic shifted to the Lombok Strait, the Malacca Strait - that romantic but shallow, narrow, and increasingly problematic passageway to the South China Sea - would be superseded, a rather bad thing for faithful and indefatigable US ally Singapore and its massive port facilities at the east end of the strait.

All things being equal, the nation with the biggest interest in a peaceful South China Sea looks to be the PRC.

Heightened tensions in the South China Sea are bad for China, and good for the United States.

So expect them to persist in 2012, and don't expect to hear about the continued growth in traffic across the Lombok Strait and other strategic Indonesian waterways.

The United States also rather maliciously fiddled with one of China's important hedge against disruption of its Middle East energy imports through the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea: the Myanmar pipeline.

Construction of the pipeline began in 2009; when completed, it will transport 12 million tons of crude oil per year - perhaps up to 10% of China's total imports.

After the Myanmar government ostentatiously pulled the plug on a massive, China-funded hydropower project in the northwest of the country, the US chose to endorse the Myanmar junta's rather risible efforts at democratization with a visit by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

If the Myanmar government mismanages its dance with the sizable and US-supported democratic opposition, the PRC may find itself dealing with a hostile, pro-Western government that will find many reasons to dislike the pipeline.

A Reuters report in October gave an indication of the importance of the pipeline, and Chinese anxiety:
China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) continues work on an oil pipeline through Myanmar and has given aid to show its goodwill, the official Chinese news agency said after Myanmar abruptly halted work on a Chinese-led power dam.

The Xinhua news agency said construction of the pipeline was "proceeding smoothly" and that CNPC said it gave $1.3 million to Myanmar on Monday to help build eight schools, as part of an agreement signed in April to provide $6 million of aid. [5]
China, of course, has more to worry about than hypocritical American mischief-making in its backyard.

It has to come to terms with the fact that its trade-driven foreign policy model has been rather resoundingly repudiated.

Perhaps biggest wake-up call for China was not downtrodden and put-upon Myanmar opening to the West, or the eternal flirtation between Pyongyang and Washington. As long as the terms of engagement remain civil and economic, contributing to an economic order with Beijing at its center, China can cautiously welcome a flow of investment into the rickety economies of the two authoritarian satellites.

It was the spectacle of Australia - a key focus of China's economic strategy and site of massive resource investments - welcoming a US military initiative to station 2,500 US troops in the Northern Territories, bending its own restrictions on dealings with non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty nations to sell uranium to India, and endorsing President Obama's efforts to nurture an anti-China trade bloc, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. China is not an obvious military threat to Australia, and Australia is a natural economic partner for China.

However, Sydney had no qualms about throwing Beijing under the bus, as it were, in order to take a high-profile role in the anti-China economic and security condominium the Obama administration is constructing in Asia.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the US push into Asia is its


effort to cast its economic interests as a matter of national security, thereby providing a new, 21st century pretext for projection of military force into the region.

In a speech before the New York Economic Club in October 2011, Secretary Clinton declared:
"The challenges of a changing world and the needs of the American people demand that our foreign policy community - as Steve Jobs put it - think different. We have to position ourselves to lead in a world where security is shaped in boardrooms and on trading floors, as well as on battlefields." [6]
Thankfully, the Obama administration, unlike the George W Bush administration, has its hands on a variety of diplomatic and economic levers to advance its agenda, not just the military option.

However, in 2011 the Obama administration appears to have come to terms with its status as the world's only military superpower. It has displayed a willingness to deploy force in a surprising number of venues, especially when drones or proxies eliminated the politically toxic exposure of US service personnel to death and injury.

Beyond the acknowledged war theaters of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US injected force into Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan, and Uganda through the use of advisers and or drones, as well as supporting a full-scale air war against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya.
The Obama administration also showed a Bush-like disregard for the headaches of nation-building, ie the geopolitical consequences of its military adventures. Libya has largely slipped off Western radar screens after the death of Gaddafi, but the country is a train wreck.

The US and other powers (including China) are footdragging on the release of frozen funds to the new regime until it can demonstrate its ability not to embezzle them - or catapult Islamists into positions of power. Representatives of the International Criminal Court have appeared in Libya to investigate traveler's tales of rape-related war crimes by Viagra-stoked Gaddafi fighters, but seemingly ready to ignore the well documented, continuing campaign of rape and murder against sub-Saharan African women by anti-Gaddafi militia.

The National Transitional Council is a picture of impotence as competing rebel militia swarm the capital. After one angry demonstration by residents of Benghazi, the TNC cravenly declared Benghazi "the economic capital of Libya" and promised to relocate key government ministries to the eastern city. Rebels from Zintan have leveraged their prolonged custody of Saif Gaddafi into the portfolio of the Ministry of Defense and refuse to withdraw their troops controlling the main airport. In order to dilute the power of Abdulhakim Belhadj, the Qatar-backed head of the Tripoli Military Council, the Libyan government is apparently encouraging him to shift his area of operations to Syria on behalf of the anti-Assad opposition. Despite the bloody precedent of Libya, the Obama administration apparently has few qualms about supporting regime change in Syria, or conducting a covert war to destabilize Iran.

It makes one wonder if the much-touted "strategic pivot" away from the Middle East, is a matter of changing targets, not tactics, and the Obama administration might be as blithe about beating up China as the Bush administration was about pounding on its Muslim enemies.

Would the United States regard chaos in China as a must-to-avoid death sentence for the global economy - or an interesting opportunity to put paid to a nettlesome competitor, as long as US boots could be kept "off the ground"?

In East Asia, the seriousness of US containment strategy could traditionally be measured by the respect Washington showed for the clear red lines of PRC sovereignty claims: Tibet and Taiwan.

To date, the Obama administration has been quite diligent in its respect for these red lines. It took a considerable amount of domestic political heat over its reluctance to sell F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan and its lack of enthusiasm for the Democratic Progressive Party, the pro-independence antagonist of the Republic of China's ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party.

Other than the usual public displays of respect for the Dalai Lama and rhetorical condemnation of China's excesses in ethnic Tibetan regions, the administration has not crossed swords with the PRC over Tibet.

Perhaps, however, with the doctrine of "preventive diplomacy" the US will decide that red lines were made to be crossed.

One of the most interesting by-products of the Libyan war and the failure of Syrian dissidents to oust the Assad regime was the US announcement of an Obama pre-emption doctrine.

Actually, it's a development of the neo-liberal R2P - "responsibility to protect" - doctrine that declares that a stated need for international humanitarian intervention trumps what the PRC calls "non-interference in internal affairs" also known as national sovereignty. Josh Rogin described the policy in Foreign Policy:
For the United States, preventive diplomacy means combining all the tools of international leverage - including the use of force - to prevent conflicts from breaking out or preventing hot conflicts from getting out of hand. It also means building sustainable economies and functioning democracies, with the goal of creating societies that can manage disputes on the national and regional levels.

[US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice] covered a lot of ground in her speech, not explicitly defending armed intervention but arguing for its use in some cases. "We should cease to make false distinctions between peacekeeping and prevention; they are in fact inextricably linked," she said.

She also argued that the use of sanctions under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter can be a tool of conflict prevention, a position council members such as China and Russian don't support.

Some other countries used the meeting to explicitly defend the U.N.-sanctioned international military intervention in Libya and called for harsher U.N. measures against the Syrian regime.

"When conflict looms, the world looks to the U.N. for a decisive response," said British Foreign Minister William Hague. "In Libya ... our swift action prevented a human catastrophe and saved the lives of thousands of civilians." [7]
From the Chinese perspective, the message is that there is only one thing more dangerous to an authoritarian regime than a successful democratic movement … and that's an unsuccessful democratic movement. If the local dissidents can't cut it, then the US can claim that it is obligated to interfere.

With generational change threatening to sideline more moderate antagonists in Dharmsala and Taipei and indications that Chinese failings in economic justice and human rights are creating a hard core of domestic opponents, the United States may start to see the PRC's frantic concern in these areas as vulnerabilities that should be exploited.

The temptations may be strongest in an unusually toxic US election year, as a faltering economy, an angry electorate, and a cynically obstructionist opposition might lead to a wag-the-dog strategy (promoting an overseas adventure to distract attention from domestic political difficulties) to advance President Obama's electoral fortunes.

There is a danger that China will draw the lesson that the US believes that snubbing China is cost-free: that China is too dependent on global trade and too weak militarily to be taken seriously as an antagonist.

Perhaps, resentful Chinese leaders will decide that the PRC, despite its reliance on a peaceful, trade-friendly international environment, needs to push back in a more overt way than simply bullying Vietnamese fishing boats in the South China Sea.

That would be a risky decision, given that the US has announced that Asia is a key US national interest - presumably, an interest it is prepared to defend with the full range of options available to it. Or, as Secretary Clinton put it: "Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests ... "

America possesses the doctrine, the means, and the motivation to make mischief for the PRC. All that is lacking, for the time being, is a suitable opportunity - or a fatal miscalculation by either side.

2012 promises to be an anxious and unpleasant year in US-China relations.

Notes
1. America's Pacific Century, Foreign Policy, November, 2011.
2. Prepare for war, Chinese navy is told as Pacific tensions grow, London Evening Standard, Dec 7, 2011.
3. No, Hu Didn't Call for War, The Diplomat, Dec 10, 2011.
4. Click Here for the Chinese text.
5. China's CNPC says Myanmar pipeline work continues despite dam row, Reuters, Oct 3, 2011.
6. Clinton Adopts Jobs's 'Think Different' Motto for Diplomacy, Bloomberg, Oct 15, 2011.
7. U.N. Security Council debates preventive diplomacy, Foreign Policy, Sep 22, 2011.

Peter Lee writes on East and South Asian affairs and their intersection with US foreign policy.

(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

by 인형사 | 2011/12/25 09:21 | 인형사 찾기 | 트랙백 | 핑백(1) | 덧글(0)

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